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INSURANCE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
During the survey period, January 31, 1988, through August 1, 1989,
the New Mexico judiciary addressed insurance law issues relating to the
general areas of procedure' and coverage. 2 In addition, the court of
appeals considered the rights of an insurer under subrogation principles.3
In administrative law, the supreme court addressed issues regarding the
powers of the Superintendent of Insurance vis-a-vis the Insurance Board
and due process rights of a rate service organization in a rate-making
hearing.4 The supreme court also decided a bad faith action involving
the failure to pay a first-party claim.5 Finally, the court of appeals
considered whether a common law negligence action was preempted by
ERISA. 6
II. PROCEDURE
Three cases decided by the courts involved procedural issues. The
supreme court examined the relationship between the Uniform Arbitration
Act7 and the Declaratory Judgment Act8 and considered whether an action
was time-barred under the Hospital Lien Act. 9 The court of appeals
addressed the preliminary procedural issue of its subject matter jurisdiction
to determine an uninsured motorist dispute.'0
1. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 107 N.M. 764, 764 P.2d 1322 (1988) (relationship between
Uniform Arbitration Act and Declaratory Judgment Act), see infra notes 11-53 and accompanying
text; Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Lacey, 107 N.M. 742, 764 P.2d 873 (1988) (Hospital Lien Act),
see infra notes 54-87 and accompanying text; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 107
N.M. 568, 761 P.2d 446 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988) (subject
matter jurisdiction), see infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
2. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 107 N.M. 568, 761 P.2d 446 (uninsured
motorist/punitive damages), see infra notes 270-308 and accompanying text; Castorena v. Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 460, 760 P.2d 152 (1988) (exclusionary provision), see infra
notes 101-18 and accompanying text; Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 322, 757
P.2d 792 (1988) (underinsured motorist/stacking), see infra notes 224-48 and accompanying text;
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 107 N.M. 208, 755 P.2d 52 (1988) (anti-indemnity statute),
see infra notes 309-32 and accompanying text; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750
P.2d 1105 (1988) (uninsured motorist/definition of "occupants"), see infra notes 249-69 and ac-
companying text; Morro v. Farmers Ins. Group, 106 N.M. 669, 748 P.2d 512 (1988) (underinsured
motorist/stacking), see infra notes 206-23 and accompanying text.
3. Farmers Ins. Group v. Martinez, 107 N.M. 82, 752 P.2d 797 (Ct. App. 1988). See infra
notes 333-60 and accompanying text.
4. National Council on Compensation Ins. v. New Mexico St. Corp. Comm'n, 107 N.M. 278,
756 P.2d 558 (1988). This case is not treated in this article. A full treatment of this case will
appear in Survey, Administrative Law, 21 N.M.L. Rav. - (1991).
5. Jessen v. National Excess Ins. Co., 108 N.M. 625, 776 P.2d 1244 (1989). See infra notes
365-417 and accompanying text.
6. Sappington v. Covington, 108 N.M. 155, 768 P.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1988). See infra notes
418-41 and accompanying text.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (1978).
8. Id. §§ 44-6-1 to -15 (1978).
9. Id. §§ 48-8-1 to 48-8-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
10. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 107 N.M. 568, 761 P.2d 446 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 700 (1988).
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
A. Arbitration and Declaratory Judgment
In Guaranty National Insurance Company v. Valdez," the supreme
court reviewed a trial court's exercise of discretion to grant declaratory
relief when an insurance policy provides for arbitration. 12 Valdez was
injured by an underinsured motorist while driving his grandfather's car. 3
The grandfather had two automobile insurance policies with Guaranty
for two separate cars.' 4 Only one of these policies covered the car involved
in the accident. 5 The insurance policy contained the following arbitration
provision: "Determination as to whether an insured person is legally
entitled to recover damages or the amount of damages shall be made
by agreement between the insured person and us. If no agreement is
reached, the decision will be made by arbitration."' 6 Guaranty sought
declaratory relief on four grounds. 7 Valdez responded with a motion to
dismiss asserting that the arbitration provision of the insurance contract
was applicable, and that the claim should go through arbitration alone."
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.' 9
On appeal, Guaranty argued that another provision of the insurance
contract applied ,20 and only the issues of liability and damages, not issues
of coverage, were subject to arbitration. 2' Valdez countered that Guaranty
was reading the provision out of context and that the coverage issues
of "stacking" and "offset of benefits" were subject to arbitration. 22 To
resolve the dispute, the court examined the relationship between the
Uniform Arbitration Act 23 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. 24
11. 107 N.M. 764, 764 P.2d 1322 (1988).
12. Id. at 765, 764 P.2d at 1323.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The grounds for declaration were:
1. That Valdez was covered by only one of the two automobile insurance policies
of his grandfather.
2. That the limits of liability were the same under the policy for the grandfather's
wrecked vehicle and under the tortfeasor's policy.
3. That Valdez was not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage.
4. That Guaranty owed Valdez nothing, under either policy provision.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 766, 764 P.2d at 1324. The provision as reproduced in the opinion stated:
If an insured person and we do not agree
(1) that the person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured motor vehicle, or
(2) as to the amount of payment under this Part, then upon written demand of
either, the issue shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association, and judgement upon the award rendered by the
arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The insured
person and we each agree to consider ourselves bound and to be bound by any
award made by the arbitrators pursuant to this coverage.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (1978).
24. Id. §§ 44-6-1 to -15 (1978).
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The standard of review of the trial court's exercise of discretion to
refuse or grant declaratory relief is whether such discretion was based
on good reason. 25 Good reason is determined by whether the court's
discretion was "liberally exercised to effectuate the purposes of the
[declaratory judgment] statute. ' 26 The statutory purpose, in turn, is "to
settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to
other legal relations, and to be liberally construed and administered. ' 27
The supreme court held that the trial court did not exercise good
reason by refusing to consider Guaranty's complaint for declaratory
judgment. 2  Following Gonzales v. United Southwest National Bank,29
the court found that the complaint for declaratory judgment raised
questions of law arising from the disputed interpretation of an arbitration
contract, and thus the proper forum for resolution was the trial court.30
Further, the court held that although questions of law can be arbitrated,
if one party resists arbitration and seeks determination of the legal issue
in court, then that party must be heard in court." Although a party
waives his rights to traditional procedural safeguards and to traditional
appeals when it agrees to arbitration, the right of a party who contends
that a particular issue is not arbitrable and who seeks pre-arbitration
judicial review of the issue may not be denied.3 2
The holding reflects the court's misgivings about the limited scope of
judicial review of an arbitration award. An arbitration award may not
be vacated on grounds that the relief granted by the arbitrator would
not be granted in judicial adjudications.33 The court stated it opposed
the language of New Mexico's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act
limiting judicial review because it deprives a party of his or her right
to the traditional safeguards afforded to parties who appeal judgments
of a trial court.3 4 In addition, the court noted that in the federal context,
the United States Supreme Court criticized arbitration because arbitrators
become the sole decisionmakers on questions of fault and are not bound
by the rules of evidence.35
25. Valdez, 107 N.M. at 766, 764 P.2d at 1324 (citing Sunwest Bank of Clovis v. Clovis IV,
106 N.M. 149, 154, 740 P.2d 699, 704 (1987)). A trial court may exercise discretion to grant or
refuse declaratory relief under section 44-6-7 of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Section 44-6-7
provides that "[t]he court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where
such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy
giving rise to the proceeding." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-6-7 (1978).
26. National Liberty Ins. Co. of Am. v. Silva, 43 N.M. 283, 289, 92 P.2d 161, 167 (1939).
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-4-14 (1978).
28. Valdez, 107 N.M. at 766, 764 P.2d at 1324.
29. 93 N.M. 522, 602 P.2d 619 (1979).
30. Valdez, 107 N.M. at 766, 764 P.2d at 1324.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 767, 764 P.2d at 1325.
33. Id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-12(A)(5) (1978) ("The fact that the relief granted was such
that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not grounds for vacating
or refusing to confirm the award.").
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing Bernhart v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956)).
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The arbitration provision in Valdez arose out of an uninsured motorist
policy.36 The standard uninsured motorist policy contains an arbitration
provision.37 Given the pervasive use of these provisions in uninsured
motorist policies, it is important to note some general developments in
arbitration in New Mexico.
New Mexico's former arbitration statute was a "present controversy"
statute.3 8 A "present controversy" statute applies to disputes arising at
the time of the signing of the arbitration provision.3 9 It was generally
thought that arbitration provisions in uninsured motorists claims were
not subject to the old arbitration statute because uninsured motorist
disputes arise in the future after the signing of the arbitration provision. 40
In 1969, in order to make uninsured motorist arbitration provisions
enforceable, 4' New Mexico enacted the de novo appeal statute. 42 This
statute specifically provided that arbitration awards arising under an
uninsured motorist provision or an automobile liability insurance policy
could be appealed to any district court for a trial de novo. 43 Subsequently,
in 1971, New Mexico adopted The Uniform Arbitration Act, which
differed from the old arbitration statute because it applied to present
and future arbitration disputes." The Uniform Arbitration Act contains
no provision that the aggrieved party may appeal for a trial de novo. 45
Rather, the Act provides that appeals can be taken from six types of
court orders, 46 and "the appeals shall be taken in the manner and to
the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action. " '41
The court resolved the inconsistency between the trial de novo statute
and the appeal procedure of the Uniform Arbitration Act in Dairyland
Insurance Co. v. Rose.48 In Dairyland, the supreme court considered the
relationship between the trial de novo statute and the Uniform Arbitration
36. Valdez, 107 N.M. at 765, 764 P.2d at 1323.
37. 2 Wmsss, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 45.1, at 133 (1987). This
provision states generally that: either party may make a written demand for arbitration in the event
that the claimant and the insurer do not agree: (1) whether that person is legally entitled to recover
damages under this endorsement, or (2) as to the amount of damages. Id. § 45.3, at 134.
38. Note, Uninsured Motorist Arbitration, 3 N.M.L. REv. 220, 223 (1973).
39. Id.
40. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Rose, 92 N.M. 527, 530, 591 P.2d 281, 284 (1979).
41. Id. at 531, 591 P.2d at 285.
42. N.M. STAT ANN. § 65-5-303 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
43. Id.
44. Note, supra note 38, at 225.
45. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (1978).
46. (1) an order denying an application to compel arbitration made under Section 2
[44-7-2 NMSA 1978];
(2) an order granting an application to stay arbitration made under Subsection B
of Section 2 [44-7-2 NMSA 1978];
(3) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) an order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) a judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Ar-
bitration Acts [44-7-1 to 44-7-22 NMSA 1978].
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-19(A) (1978).
47. Id. § 44-7-19(B) (1978).
48. 92 N.M. 527, 591 P.2d 281 (1979).
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Act and held that the trial de novo was repealed by implication in the
Uniform Arbitration Act. 49 The court stated that "the Legislature and
the courts have expressed a strong policy preference for resolution of
disputes by arbitration."50
According to Valdez, if a party resists arbitration and seeks a declaratory
judgment by the trial court, the trial court must hear the issue.,, Should
the trial court, however, determine that the parties agreed to arbitrate
the issues raised in the complaint, the court may require the parties to
arbitrate the issues.52 In Valdez, the court reversed the trial court's
dismissal and remanded with instructions to consider the complaint for
declaratory judgment on its merits .53
B. The Hospital Lien Act
The Hospital Lien Act54 allows a hospital, which has provided emer-
gency, medical, or other service to any patient injured in an accident
and not covered by workers' compensation laws, to assert a lien "upon
that part of the judgment, settlement or compromise going or belonging
to such patient .... -"5 The Hospital Lien Act provides procedures for
filing and notice,56 as well as release of hospital liens. 7 Further, this act
sets forth the persons liable for payment and a one-year limitation of
actions period.5 At issue in Regents of the University of New Mexico
v. Lacey59 was the interpretation of the limitation of actions provision.
That provision states that "[1liability of the person, firm or corporation
for the satisfaction of the hospital lien shall continue for a period of
one year after the date of any payment of any money to the patient,
his heirs or legal representatives as damages or under a contract of
compromise or settlement."6
The only New Mexico case which has construed this provision involved
a situation where the payment was made to the patient. 6' The court held
that payment of any money to a patient must be actually received by
the patient to begin the tolling of the statute of limitations. 62 In Lacey
the situation involved payment to a "legal representative," and the
supreme court further construed the terms "payment ' 63 and "legal rep-
resentative. "
49. Id. at 530, 591 P.2d at 284.
50. Id.
51. Valdez, 107 N.M. at 766, 764 P.2d at 1324.
52. Id. at 767, 764 P.2d at 1325.
53. Id.
54. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-8-1 to -7 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
55. Id. § 48-8-1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
56. Id. § 48-8-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
57. Id. § 48-8-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
58. Id. § 48-8-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
59. 107 N.M. 742, 764 P.2d 873 (1987).
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-8-3(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
61. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 709, 712 P.2d 1371 (1986).
62. Id. at 711-12, 712 P.2d at 1373-74.
63. Lacey, 107 N.M. at 744, 764 P.2d at 874.
64. Id.
Spring 1990]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
The defendant, Lacey, was involved in a collision with an automobile
while riding his motorcycle. 65 The automobile driver was at fault and
was insured by Liberty Mutual.6 Lacey incurred hospital expenses of
$20,594.51 at the University of New Mexico (UNM) Hospital. 67 The
Regents filed their notice of a hospital lien in accordance with section
48-8-2 of the Act on April 26, 1985.6
The salient facts in the case involved the time sequence of events.
Thirteen months after the Regents filed their hospital lien, Liberty Mutual
issued a $58,265.35 check on behalf of its insured to Lacey's attorney.
The check was received on May 28, 1986, endorsed by Lacey and deposited
into his attorney's trust account on November 6, 1986.69 Subsequently,
on November 10, 1986, Lacey's attorney sought a fifty percent reduction
in Lacey's hospital fees. 70 UNM Hospital refused the reduction, asserting
that they were constitutionally prohibited from receiving less than full
payment. 7' Lacey's attorney disregarded the hospital's refusal and sent
UNM Hospital a check for only $10,000 on January 15, 1987.72 Six
months later, on June 19, 1987, the Regents of UNM sued Lacey and
Liberty Mutual for debt and money due on an open account and for
enforcement of their hospital lien.73 Lacey's attorney moved for dismissal
on the basis that the suit was time-barred pursuant to section 48-8-3(B)
of the Act.7 4 The trial court held that the one-year statute of limitations
began to toll on May 28, 1986, the date Lacey's attorney received the
check. 75 Therefore, the suit, brought on June 19, 1987, was dismissed. 76
On appeal, the Regents of UNM made three arguments to delay the
tolling of the statute of limitations. 77 First, because the check for $58,265.35
was accompanied by three requirements for a release 78 and was not
endorsed and deposited until November 6, 1986, the Regents asserted
that "payment of any money" was not satisfied, and thus, the statutory
period did not begin to run before November 10, 1986. 79 Second, the
Regents asserted that payment to an attorney was not payment to a
"legal representative" within the statute. 0 Finally, the Regents argued
that misrepresentation by Liberty Mutual on November 10, 1986, tolled
the statute of limitations.8
65. Id. at 743, 764 P.2d at 873.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Accompanying the check was a release form requiring Lacey to fill in the date he signed
the release, to write that he read the release, and to sign his name in front of a notary.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 744-45, 764 P.2d at 875-76.
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The court held that although delivery of a check was not per se
payment, payment occurred when the check was delivered to Lacey's
counsel.12 Further, the court held that Lacey's attorney was a legal
representative under the statute interpreting "legal representative" in a
broad sense.A3
In addressing the alleged misrepresentation, the court set forth the
elements of equitable estoppel and found that the facts of Lacey did
not support estoppel.8 4 First, the Regents did not prove misrepresentation
by Liberty Mutual.85 Second, the Regents did not lack knowledge of the
facts regarding the one year statute of limitations. 6 Third, the Regents
knew payment was made no later than November 1986. Therefore, they
did not lack knowledge of the fact of payment.87
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Maidment,18 the
court of appeals considered the preliminary procedural issue of jurisdiction
to determine an uninsured motorist claim. 9 Rule of Appellate Procedure
12-102(A)(1) 90 provides that appeals from the district court will be taken
to the supreme court when "one or more counts of the complaint alleges
a breach of contract or otherwise sounds in contract." Maidment argued
that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction because the controversy arose
out of an insurance contract and required interpretation of the rights
and obligations of the parties to the contract. 9'
The court conceded that the obligations of an insurer are determined
by contract principles. 92 However, the court of appeals had previously
decided in Sandoval v. Valdez93 that where the resolution of the case is
contingent upon the tort liability of the uninsured motorist, the court
82. Id. at 743-44, 764 P.2d at 874-75 (citing Franciscan Hotel Co. v. Albuquerque Hotel Co.,
37 N.M. 456, 472, 24 P.2d 718, 726 (1933) (if upon delivery of the check, drawer has sufficient
funds in drawee bank and the check is paid upon presentment, the date of payment will be deemed
to have been made as of original delivery date)).
83. Id. at 744, 764 P.2d at 875. The court held "[a] legal representative, defined in its broadest
sense, is one who stands in place of another and represents the interests of another; a pqrson who
oversees the legal affairs of another." Id.
84. Id. at 745, 764 P.2d at 876 (citing Capo v. Century Life Ins. Co., 94 N.M. 373, 377, 610
P.2d 1202, 1206 (1980)). For the party to be estopped, (1) the party's conduct must amount to a
false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) the party must intend such conduct shall
be acted upon; (3) the party must have knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. For
the party claiming estoppel, (1) the party must show lack of knowledge and means of knowledge
of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) the party must rely upon the conduct of the party
estopped; and (3) action taken upon such reliance must prejudice the party. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 107 N.M. 568, 761 P.2d 446 (Ct. App. 1988).
89. Id. at 569-70, 761 P.2d at 447-48. For a full discussion of the substantive issues in Maidment,
see infra notes 270-308 and accompanying text.
90. SUP. CT. RuLEs ANN. 12-102(A)(2) (Recomp. 1986).
91. Maidment, 107 N.M. at 569, 761 P.2d at 447.
92. Id. at 570, 761 P.2d at 448.
93. 91 N.M. 705, 580 P.2d 131 (Ct. App. 1978).
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of appeals has jurisdiction. The issue in Maidment was the availability
of punitive damages. 94 An insured person may recover punitive damages
from his insurer if he could have recovered them from the uninsured
motorist. 95 Since recovery of punitive damages is contingent upon the
tort liability of the uninsured motorist, the court found that it had
jurisdiction. 96
II. COVERAGE
The majority of cases decided in the insurance area involved coverage
issues. 97 The appellate courts considered exclusionary provisions,98 un-
insured/underinsured motorists coverage" and the validity of an insurance
provision in an indemnity contract.'0°
A. Exclusionary Provisions
In Castorena v. Colonial Life & Accidental Insurance Co.,I01 the su-
preme court construed a liability provision which excluded loss caused
by disease or medical procedures. Castorena, a diabetic, had a hypogly-
cemic seizure while driving; he veered off the road and hit a sign. 0 2
Castorena was not injured in the accident, but he was transported to a
local hospital because he was in a coma. 03 At the hospital, Castorena
was given an intravenous (IV) solution for insulin shock.'04 The IV needle
was improperly inserted, causing Castorena's left hand to later become
gangrenous. 105 Surgery on the hand was unsuccessful and Castorena's left
arm was amputated below the elbow.'06
The policy provided coverage for a single dismemberment arising out
of "accidental injury," defined as "bodily injury effected solely, directly,
independently and exclusively of all other causes by accident during the
term of this Policy."' 0 7 Additionally, the policy excluded loss for "disease
94. Maidment, 107 N.M. at 570, 761 P.2d at 448.
95. Stewart v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 744, 747, 726 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1986).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1984) (uninsured motorist insurance is "for the
protection of persons . . . who are legally entitled to recover damages").
96. Maidment, 107 N.M. at 570, 761 P.2d at 448.
97. L'Allier v. Turnacliff, 107 N.M. 382, 758 P.2d 796 (1988), decided a coverage issue, but
is not discussed below because it restates an existing principle of law concerning insurable interests.
L'Allier held that it is not necessary to have title in an automobile in order to have an insurable
interest in the automobile. This holding is in accordance with the principle set forth in Forsythe
v. Central Mut. -Ins. Co. of N.Y., 84 N.M. 461, 505 P.2d 56 (1973).
98. Castorena v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 460, 760 P.2d 152.
99. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 107 N.M. 568, 761 P.2d 446 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988); Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 107
N.M. 322, 757 P.2d 792 (1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105 (1988);
Morro v. Farmers Ins. Group, 106 N.M. 669, 748 P.2d 512 (1988).
100. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 107 N.M. 208, 755 P.2d 52 (1988).
101. 107 N.M. 460, 760 P.2d 152 (1988).
102. Id. at 461, 760 P.2d at 153.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 462, 760 P.2d at 154.
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or any degenerative process; physical or mental infirmity, medical, surgical
or diagnostic procedure therefor."'10 8
Castorena sought recovery for the loss of his left arm under his policy
with Colonial. He claimed that the loss was caused by the accidental
insertion of the IV needle. 1°9 Colonial denied the request, stating that
the amputation was not the result of the accident, but rather was the
result of a medical procedure for the diabetic condition and was subject
to the exclusionary provision. 10
The court interpreted the "accidental injury" exclusionary provision
to exclude the improper treatment undertaken as a result of his diabetic
seizure.' l Following a 1966 New Jersey Superior Court decision, Dinkowitz
v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,"' the supreme court found that
loss resulting from medical or surgical treatment of a bodily condition
caused by accidental means does not exempt the insurer from payment
of benefits under the exclusionary clause, while a loss resulting from
treatment of a bodily condition not caused by accidental means is
one which is expressly excluded from coverage of the benefit by the
limiting language of the exclusionary clause." 3
The court further noted that a mistake by a treating physician may be
an "accident"; however, if the mistake occurs during "medical treatment"
as defined by the exclusionary clause, "it is not a risk assumed by the
insurance company within the language of the policy." 1" 4
The court, finding the language of the policy unambiguous, strictly
enforced the exclusion." 5 The court held that "but for" Castorena's
diabetic condition, the insertion of the IV needle would have been un-
necessary." 6 Castorena was not injured in the accident; rather his loss
was due to the pre-existing diabetic condition." ' 7 The exclusionary pro-
vision, clear and unambiguous in excluding treatment of a bodily condition
not caused by an accident, would be rendered meaningless if the provision
was not enforced."18
B. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage
Three cases were decided by the supreme court involving uninsured/
underinsured motorists provisions." 9 The supreme court decided two stack-
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. 90 N.J. Super. 181, 216 A.2d 613 (Law Div. 1966).
113. Castorena, 107 N.M. at 462, 760 P.2d at 154 (emphasis in original).
114. Id. (citing Dinkowitz, 90 N.J. Super. at 188, 216 A.2d at 618).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Although not explained, the rationale inheres from the contractual focus of the case.
Since the court began its analysis with the general principle that "the obligation of a liability insurer
is contractual," and the exclusionary provision was not ambiguous, the court followed the insurance
contract and enforced the exclusion as written. Id.
119. Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 322, 757 P.2d 792 (1988); Morro v.
Farmers Ins. Group, 106 N.M. 669, 748 P.2d 512 (1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M.
779, 750 P.2d 1105 (1988).
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ing disputes 20 and construed the term "occupant" under a particular
uninsured motorist provision. 2'
1. The Uninsured Motorist Statute
The uninsured motorist statute' 22 mandates that all automobile liability
policies issued in New Mexico contain uninsured 23 and underinsured 124
motorist protection unless the insured rejects the coverage.' 25 An under-
insured motorist is one whose total bodily injury insurance coverage
"applicable at the time of the accident is less than the limits of liability
under the insured's uninsured motorist statute.' 1 26 To be afforded pro-
tection under the uninsured or underinsured motorist statute, the persons
insured must be "legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles.' ' 27
The purpose underlying the statute is "to protect persons injured in
automobile accidents from losses which because of the tortfeasor's lack
of liability coverage, would otherwise go uncompensated.' 12s Moreover,
"[t]he uninsured motorist statute must be liberally construed to implement
this purpose of compensating those injured through no fault of their
own.' ' 29 Liberal construction has promoted the use of stacking in New
Mexico, and the general trend is to favor stacking. 30
2. Stacking
As the New Mexico Supreme Court has defined the term, "[s]tacking
refers to an insured's attempted recovery of damages by aggregating the
coverage under more than one policy or under one policy covering more
than one automobile."'' The scope of stacking has gradually evolved
through the decisions in five cases. "2 To understand the two cases in
the survey period which expand existing precedent, a review of the New
Mexico law is necessary.
120. Jimenez, 107 N.M. 322, 757 P.2d 792; Morro, 106 N.M. 669, 748 P.2d 512.
121. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105.
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
123. Id. § 66-5-301(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
124. Id. § 66-5-301(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
125. Id. § 66-5-301(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
126. Id. § 66-5-301(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
127. Id. § 66-5-301(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). "[T]he insured must establish .. .a substantive right
to recover damages from the uninsured motorist." R. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
§ 133(b)(1) (1987).
128. Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 329, 533 P.2d 100, 102 (1975)
(quoting Abate v. Pioneer Mutual Cas. Co., 22 Ohio St. 2d 161, 165, 258 N.E.2d 429, 432 (1970)).
129. Id.
130. Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 169, 646 P.2d 1230, 1233 (1982) (citing
Taft v. Cerwonka, 433 A.2d 215, 218 (1981)).
131. Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 757, 726 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1986).
132. See Sloan v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974); Lopez v. Foundation
Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 646 P.2d 1230 (1982); Konnick v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 103
N.M. 112, 703 P.2d 889 (1985); Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 216, 704
P.2d 1092 (1985); Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 726 P.2d 1386 (1986).
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a. The development of stacking in New Mexico. The first case per-
mitting stacking in New Mexico was Sloan v. Dairyland Insurance Co.'33
In Sloan, the insured was killed while riding as a passenger in an
automobile struck by an uninsured motorist.'3 4 The amount of damages
exceeded $20,000.115 The estate recovered $10,000 under the insurance
policy covering the automobile involved in the accident.'3 6 The estate then
sought to recover under the decedent's own policy which covered a car
not involved in the accident.1 7 The supreme court permitted the decedent's
estate to stack the policy covering the automobile involved in the accident
with the decedent's policy covering a car not involved in the accident.138
The insurance company asserted the defense of "other insurance"; that
is, since the insured had already been paid under one policy by another
insurance company, she was not entitled to recover under her own policy
which contained a clause excluding any coverage in excess of the limit
of liability. 3 9 To allow recovery under more than one policy would award
the insured a "windfall."' 4 The insurance company asserted that the
legislature intended only to allow stacking up to the minimum statutory
protection. At that time the minimum protection was $10,000.1 4'
The court stated that the "better reasoned" view allowed coverage
under more than one policy. 42 After interpreting the uninsured motorist
statute, the supreme court reasoned that "[wie find in our statutory
scheme a minimum uninsured motorist coverage without difficulty, but
are unable to perceive a maximum."'' 43 The court also recognized that
an insurance company should not be able to avoid coverage "for which
it contracted and received a premium."'"1 This opened the door to the
development of stacking law in New Mexico.
Sloan allowed inter-policy stacking, the stacking of two policies. The
next case, Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. ,14 allowed intra-
policy stacking, the stacking within one policy. Intra-policy stacking arises
when one insurance policy covers more than one of the insured's vehicles.
In Lopez, the court also began to develop distinctions between types of
insureds.'"
Lopez, the insured, and a passenger riding in his car, James Torres,
were killed in a collision with an uninsured motorist. 47 Lopez had an
133. 86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974).
134. Id. at 66, 519 P.2d at 302.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 67, 519 P.2d at 303.
139. Id. at 66, 519 P.2d at 302.
140. Id. at 68, 519 P.2d at 304.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 67, 519 P.2d at 303.
143. Id. at 68, 519 P.2d at 304.
144. Id.
145. 98 N.M. 166, 646 P.2d 1230 (1982).
146. Id. at 169, 646 P.2d at 1233.
147. Id. at 167, 646 P.2d at 1231.
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existing policy covering two cars, each with an uninsured motorist coverage
of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident. 4 The policy also con-
tained a limit of liability provision. The insurance company asserted that
this provision limited the combined recovery for both Lopez and Torres
to $30,000.149
The court found the limit of liability provision to be ambiguous and
construed it against the insurance company. 50 The court analyzed Sloan
and found that the trend is to favor stacking.' The court reasoned that
"the intent of the legislature is to assure that no insured motorist will
remain uncompensated for injuries caused by an uninsured motorist.' 15 2
The court also stated that an additional policy rationale for allowing
stacking is that stacking meets "the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured."'3 The doctrine of "reasonable expectations" evades definition.
Some courts interpret the reasonable expectations from the viewpoint of
the insured who purchased the policy, other courts consider a reasonable
person in the insured's position. 54 Presumably, the court followed the
reasonable expectations of the insured.
In Lopez, the court held that where multiple uninsured motorist prem-
iums have been charged "it is only fair that the insured be permitted
to stack the coverages for which he has paid.""' This applies even when
the second premium to be stacked is reduced. 56 The crucial distinction
set forth in Lopez is that in order for policies to be stacked, separate
premiums must be paid on the policy. 5 7 Stacking is not determined by
the number of policies in force but by the number of premiums paid.' 8
In Lopez, the court also distinguished between the named insured and
the passenger and held that a passenger could only recover under the
policy of the automobile involved in the accident.5 9 Later this distinction
between types of insureds would develop into distinctions between "clas-
ses" of insureds.160
The next major decision, Konnick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. ,61 expanded the use of stacking to underinsured motorist
148. Id.
149. Id. at 168, 646 P.2d at 1232.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 169, 646 P.2d at 1233.
152. Id. at 170, 646 P.2d at 1234.
153. Id.
154. R. JERRY, supra note 127, § 25D.
155. Lopez, 98 N.M. at 171, 646 P.2d at 1235.
156. Id. The premium on the second automobile was one dollar less than the premium on the
first automobile. The insurance company argued that the lesser premium was charged because of
the "lesser likelihood of both vehicles being operated at the same time, and therefore, being 'at
risk' at the same time." Thus, Foundation asserted one risk was meant to be covered and the
policies should not be stacked. Id. at 172, 646 P.2d at 1236.
157. Id. at 171, 646 P.2d at 1235.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Konnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 112, 115, 703 P.2d 889, 892
(1985).
161. Id.
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policies. Tiffany Konnick, the insured's stepdaughter, was injured in a
collision with an insured motorist. 62 Konnick's medical expenses resulting
from the accident exceeded $100,000.16 The insured driver only had
$15,000 of liability coverage.'6 Konnick's stepfather had two automobile
policies providing uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage of $15,000
per automobile.1 65 Konnick was paid $15,000 from the other driver and
$15,000 under one of her stepfather's policies.166 Konnick then sought
coverage under her stepfather's second uninsured and underinsured policy. 67
The trial court permitted stacking of underinsured motorist policies.'6
The insurance company appealed, arguing that the policy considerations
underlying uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage are "intrinsically
different," and therefore underinsured motorist policies should not be
stacked. 69 The supreme court rejected this argument and held that "as
with uninsured motorist coverage, an insured is entitled to stack under-
insured motorist policies for which separate premiums have been paid.' '1 70
In Konnick, the court made the distinction between classes of insureds
first noted in Lopez.' 7' The insurance company asserted that Tiffany
Konnick, like the passenger in Lopez, was entitled only to recovery under
the car involved in the accident. 72 The supreme court distinguished Lopez
on the basis that Konnick was a relative.' 73 The court again used the
doctrine of "reasonable expectations" and held the stepfather would
reasonably expect that his stepdaughter would be covered for injuries
caused by an underinsured motorist. 74
The supreme court stated the policy recognized two classes of insureds
for the purpose of coverage in this case.'" "Class one" insureds include
the "named insured as stated in the policy, the spouse, and relatives
residing in the household.' ' 76 "Class two" insureds "enjoy insured status
only while they occupy the insured vehicle.' ' 77 Under the terms of the
policy in Konnick, relatives residing in the household of the insured could
stack underinsured motorist policies. 78
In Schmick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,'" the
supreme court allowed the insured to stack uninsured motorist policies
162. Id. at 113, 703 P.2d at 890.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 114, 703 P.2d at 891.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 114-15, 703 P.2d at 891-92.
173. Id. at 115, 703 P.2d at 892.
174. Id. at 116, 703 P.2d at 893.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 115, 703 P.2d at 892.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 103 N.M. 216, 704 P.2d 1092 (1985).
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to determine whether the tortfeasor was underinsured. Schmick, the plain-
tiff, had two uninsured motorist policies for two separate cars.' °0 Each
policy had an underinsured motorist provision for coverage up to $15,000.111
Schmick was a named insured under one policy. 82 Under the other policy,
Schmick's husband was the named insured. Thus, Schmick was covered
under the second policy because she was the spouse. 83 Each policy also
contained a provision excluding uninsured motorist coverage to an insured
while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named insured or
any relative resident in the same household.8 4
Schmick was injured while driving the automobile for which she was
the named insured. 85 The other driver's insurance company paid Schmick
$25,000, the full amount of the other driver's liability coverage. 8 6 Schmick
brought a declaratory judgment action against her insurer, seeking to
stack her two underinsured motorist policies and recover the full amount
of $30,000.17 The trial court allowed Schmick to stack her underinsured
motorist coverage but offset this stacked amount by the liability coverage
already received from the other driver.8 8 Schmick was only allowed to
recover the difference between her stacked underinsured motorist coverage
and the liability coverage of the other driver, or $5,000.189 The trial court
determined that the underinsured motorist protection was only intended
to supplement the amount paid by the underinsured motorist, up to "the
limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance applicable at
the time of the accident.",9o
The supreme court affirmed the district court's decision. 19' The court
allowed the underinsured motorist policies to be stacked; however, the
court held that the amount recoverable was different from that recoverable
under uninsured motorist claims because the legislature specifically set
forth in the statute "the minimum and maximum amount an insured
can collect from his underinsured motorist carrier."'1 92 The court stated,
"Therefore, an insured collects from his underinsured motorist carrier
the difference between his uninsured motorist coverage and the tortfeasoris
liability coverage or the difference between his damages and the tort-
feasor's liability coverage, whichever is less.' 193
Additionally, the court found the exclusionary provision to be ambig-
uous and construed the provision against State Farm. 194 More importantly,
180. Id. at 217, 704 P.2d at 1093.
181. Id. at 218, 704 P.2d at 1094.
182. Id. at 217, 704 P.2d at 1093.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 220, 704 P.2d at 1096.
185. Id. at 218, 704 P.2d at 1094.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 217-18, 704 P.2d at 1093-94.
188. Id. at 218, 704 P.2d at 1094.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989)).
191. Id. at 224, 704 P.2d at 1100.
192. Id. at 222, 704 P.2d at 1098.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 221, 704 P.2d at 1097. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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the court held that the provision was void as against public policy. 9
Since the insured was "legally entitled" to recover damages and the
tortfeasor was underinsured, excluding recovery under one of the policies
would be "against the policy of compensating persons injured through
no fault of their own.'9
In the last case prior to the survey period, Gamboa v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,' 97 the court placed some limitations on stacking. Ernesto Gamboa
was riding in his father's car; Andrew Trujillo was driving the car. 98
Gamboa and Trujillo were killed in a collision with an uninsured mo-
torist.19 Gamboa's father had an uninsured motorist policy for the car
involved in the accident. The estates of Gamboa and Trujillo each re-
covered $15,000 under this policy. 2°° Trujillo's father had an uninsured
motorist policy with Allstate Insurance Company on another automobile,
not involved in the accident. 20' Gamboa's estate sought recovery under
Trujillo's father's policy. 202
At issue was whether Gamboa was an insured under Trujillo's father's
policy. 230 Since the insurance policy was clear in defining insureds, the
supreme court strictly interpreted the policy provisions.2 Gamboa was
denied coverage because he did not fall within class one insurance coverage
as defined by the policy. 205
b. Stacking cases during the survey period. In Morro v. Farmers
Insurance Group,2°6 the supreme court allowed an insured to stack three
policies. Under two policies Morro was a class one insured, and under
the third policy she was a class two insured.7 Each policy was then
credited with a prorated offset from the underinsured motorist's liability
proceeds.
While putting groceries into the trunk of her daughter's car, Caroline
Morro was struck by a car driven by a third party. She sustained serious
injuries. 20 Morro could have recovered under the liability insurance policy
of the third party, her daughter's automobile policy with Foundation
Reserve, or her own two automobile policies with Farmers Insurance
covering cars not involved in the accident. 209 Each policy had a $25,000
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 104 N.M. 756, 726 P.2d 1386 (1986).
198. Id. at 757, 726 P.2d at 1387.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 760, 726 P.2d at 1390. The supreme court held that "considering the contract as a
whole we find the policy language is unambiguous." Id.
205. Id.
206. 106 N.M. 669, 748 P.2d 512 (1988).
207. Id. at 670, 748 P.2d at 513.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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limit. 210 As the named insured, Morro was a class one insured under her
two policies.Y She was a class two insured under her daughter's policy
because she was an occupant of the car involved in the accident. 21 2
Morro settled with the third party for $25,000.23 She then sought
recovery from her daughter's insurer, Foundation Reserve, by stacking
her daughter's policy with her own two policies.2 4 If all policies were
stacked, the coverage would be $75,000, making the third party under-
insured by $50,000.215
The trial court granted summary judgment in Morro's favor. 216 Foun-
dation Reserve appealed, claiming Morro was not entitled to stack class
one and class two policies to determine underinsured status.2 7 Foundation
further asserted that the third party was not underinsured because the
third party's coverage was "not less than, but equal to, the maximum
limits of uninsured motorist coverage ($25,000). ' '218
The issue in this case was a question of first impression. 21 9 In affirming
the trial court, the supreme court extracted principles from the preceding
cases to reach its decision. Quoting Schmick, the court noted that the
legislature intended the injured insured to be put in the same position
as if the tortfeasor had liability coverage equaling the amount of un-
derinsured motorist coverage purchased for the insured's benefit.2 The
court further noted the reasonable expectations, described in Konnick,
that an insured who purchases a policy and pays premiums "expects that
benefits will be paid to an occupant if an underinsured motorist injures
the occupant of the insured vehicle."221 Therefore, the daughter could
reasonably expect her mother to be covered. Finally, the only limitations
on stacking are "that the insured legally be entitled to recover damages
and that the negligent driver be either uninsured or underinsured." 2
Thus, the court held that case law "overwhelmingly" supported allowing
class one and class two uninsured motorist coverage to be stacked and
continued the trend favoring stacking. 22
In Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co.,224 the supreme court
was asked to enforce a clear and unambiguous liability provision pro-
hibiting stacking of multiple uninsured motorist premiums. The court
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 672, 748 P.2d at 515.
221. Id. at 671, 748 P.2d at 514.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 672, 748 P.2d at 515.
224. 107 N.M. 322, 757 P.2d 798 (1988).
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applied a two-part test to review the exclusionary provision. 225 To be
enforced, the exclusionary provision must be clear and unambiguous, and
it must not conflict with public policy as found either in express statutory
language or legislative intent. 226 The court found that although the limit
of liability provision passed the first test, it was nonetheless void because
it violated public policy. 227
Jimenez, the plaintiff, was injured in a car accident.228 At the time of
the accident, Jimenez had a policy in effect with Foundation Reserve,
under which he paid two premiums to cover two separate vehicles. 229 The
policy insured each vehicle for uninsured motorist coverage of $25,000
per person per accident, and $50,000 per accident. 230 The policy also
contained a limit of liability provision that denied multiple uninsured
motorist coverage claims. 23' At trial the parties stipulated damages of
$50,000 with Jimenez receiving one-half of this amount from the the
negligent driver's insurer. 232 Jimenez then sought to stack his uninsured
motorist coverage in order to receive underinsured motorist coverage from
Foundation Reserve. 233 Foundation Reserve refused, claiming that the
negligent driver was not underinsured because the limit of liability pro-
vision only entitled Jimenez to $25,000.234 Summary judgment was granted
in favor of Jimenez. 235
The court's analysis of the exclusionary provision began with the well-
settled principle that the legislative intent of the uninsured motorist statute
is to compensate an injured person to the extent of insurance liability
purchased for his or her own benefit. 2 6 Pursuant to Schmick, exclusionary
provisions which attempt to limit stacking are void as against public
policy. 237 Even though Schmick was distinguishable because the exclu-
225. Id. at 324, 757 P.2d at 794 (citing March v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 101 N.M.
689, 691, 687 P.2d 1040, 1042 (1984)).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 323, 757 P.2d at 793.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. The insurance policy provided,
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each person" for uninsured
motorist coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily
injury sustained by any one person in any one auto accident. Subject to this limit
for "each person," the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each
accident" for Uninsured Motorist Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for
all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one auto accident. This is the
most we will pay regardless of the number of covered persons, claims made, vehicles
or premiums shown in the Declarations, or vehicles involved in the auto accident.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 324, 757 P.2d at 794 (citing Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M.
216, 704 P.2d 1092 (1985)).
237. Id. In Schmick, the court held a clause excluding coverage while occupying a vehicle owned
by the named insured "other than" the insured motor vehicle was "void as against New Mexico's
policy of compensating persons injured through no fault of their own." 103 N.M. 216, 221, 704
P.2d 1092, 1097. For a discussion of Schmick, see supra notes 179-96 and accompanying text.
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sionary provision in that case was ambiguous, the court stated that the
issue of ambiguity was not determinative. 21
The court recognized that when an insured has purchased multiple
premiums he would reasonably expect to be compensated and should be
compensated when injured through no fault of his own. 219 Thus, when
an insured has paid separate premiums on different vehicles for uninsured/
underinsured coverage, it is "particularly repugnant to public policy" to
prohibit stacking. An insurance company may not "collect a premium
for certain protection and then take it away by a limiting clause.'' 
Applying the formula set forth in Schmick, the court allowed Jimenez
to recover "[t]he difference between his uninsured motorist coverage and
the tortfeasor's liability coverage or the difference between his damages
and the tortfeasor's liability coverage, whichever is less." 2
The dissenting opinion by Justice Stowers focused on the contractual
aspects of the case.243 Justice Stowers asserted that no statutory public
policy exists which either prohibits or requires stacking.2" In the absence
of such a policy, Justice Stowers vigorously criticized the majority for
rewriting the clear terms contained in the insurance contract.241 He argued
that straightforward contractual analysis would appropriately dispose of
the case.24 As such, the policy would be construed by the parties' intent
at the time it was made and in light of an objective, reasonable person
standard2 7 According to Justice Stowers, parties entering a contractual
relationship are bound thereby, and Jimenez should have been bound by
the clause limiting liability2 8
3. The Definition of "Occupant"
An insurance policy is a contract, and policy coverage inevitably involves
an interpretation of the terms of the insurance contract. Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Graham29 presented the supreme court with a question of first
impression asking the court to define the term "occupant" in an uninsured
motorist provision. 20
Graham drove her father's car to help her friend, Pearl Silva, fix a
flat tire on Silva's car. 25' Graham met with Silva and they took the flat
238. Jimenez, 107 N.M. at 324, 757 P.2d at 794.
239. Id. at 325, 757 P.2d at 795. This is so, despite the clear limit-of-liability clause, "because
case law in this jurisdiction repeatedly has stated the public policy which allows uninsured/underinsured
motorist coverage to be stacked when separate premiums are paid for additional coverage." Id.
240. Id. at 324, 757 P.2d at 794.
241. Id. at 326, 757 P.2d at 796 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 94 Nev. 699,
586 P.2d 313, 315 (1978)).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 327, 757 P.2d at 797.
244. Id. at 328, 757 P.2d at 798.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 329, 757 P.2d at 799.
249. 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105 (1988).
250. Id. at 780, 750 P.2d at 1106.
251. Id. at 779, 750 P.2d at 1105.
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tire to be repaired.2 12 Upon returning from the repair shop, Graham
parked her father's car approximately three feet in front of Silva's car.
253
Graham proceeded to change Silva's flat tire and was struck by another
car as it ran off the road. 254 The car which struck Graham, and Silva's
car, was uninsured.255 The only possible coverage for Graham was under
the uninsured motorist provision of her father's car. 256
The father's policy applied to the named insured as well as "any other
person while occupying an insured motor vehicle.' '257 Graham conceded
that she was only entitled to coverage under this section.258 "Occupying"
was further defined in the policy as "in or upon or entering into or
alighting from. ' 259 Thus, whether Graham had coverage hinged upon the
interpretation of the word "occupying. ' ' 2 60
The lower court granted summary judgment to Graham. 261 On appeal,
the supreme court reversed the district court and granted summary judg-
ment to Allstate. 262 The supreme court looked to other jurisdictions for
guidance and identified factors that courts have used to determine the
definition of occupant. 263 These factors include distance in time and
space26 and a "reasonable connection" between the claimant and the
vehicle at the time of the accident. 265 The court denied Graham's assertion
that the term "occupying" was ambiguous and determined the issue on
the claimant's close proximity to the car while engaged in an activity
"so related to its operation and use as to be an integral part of the
claimant's occupancy and use of the car." ' 26 The court held that Graham
''simply was not engaged in a transaction oriented to the use of the
[father's car] at the time of the accident. ' 267 The court reasoned that
the purpose in using the car was to deliver the spare tire, rather than
to change the flat tire.261 Since this purpose was accomplished when the
father's car was parked and the tire was delivered, the accident was not
related to the use of the father's car. 269 Thus, the term "occupant," as
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 780, 750 P.2d at 1106.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 779, 750 P.2d at 1105.
262. Id. at 780-81, 750 P.2d at 1106-07.
263. Id. at 780, 750 P.2d at 1106.
264. Id. The court noted that "[fin some cases, the distance in space or time the claimant is
from the car is the controlling factor." Id. (citing Greer v. Kenilworth Ins. Co., 60 I. App. 3d
22, 376 N.E.2d 346 (1978) (where an insured standing ten to fifteen feet away was not "occupying"
the vehicle)).
265. Id. (citing Manning v. Summit Home Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 79, 623 P.2d 1235 (Ct. App.
1980)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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judicially construed and modified by the concept of use, was not broad
enough to cover Graham.
4. Punitive Damages
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Maidment,270 the
court of appeals denied an insured the ability to recover punitive damages
under his uninsured motorist policy when the tortfeasor died before the
award was made. Maidment was riding his motorcycle when he was
involved in a collision with an automobile driven by an uninsured
motorist.2 7' The uninsured motorist died before Maidment's claim was
submitted to arbitration. 272 Subsequently, the arbitrators found the de-
ceased uninsured motorist to be grossly negligent 273 and awarded Maidment
$175,000 in compensatory damages and recommended that the district
court award $25,000 in punitive damages. 274 Maidment applied for con-
firmation of the arbitration award and the trial court accepted the ar-
bitrators' recommendation. 275 State Farm appealed the portion of the
judgment awarding punitive damages. 276
Two cases in New Mexico analyze the issue of whether punitive damages
are recoverable. 277 In a 1986 case, Stewart v. State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Co.,278 the supreme court held that an insured .who
has been injured by an uninsured tortfeasor and awarded a judgment
of punitive damages may collect the punitive damages from his own
insurance company.2 79 The holding of Stewart is that "an insured may
recover punitive damages from his insurer if he would be legally entitled
to recover them from the uninsured tortfeasor. "280 This principle follows
the language of the uninsured motorist statute. 28' The second case, Baker
v. Armstrong,282 decided one year later, dealt with the contrary situation,
in which the insured is the tortfeasor. In Baker, the court held that an
insured who has punitive damages assessed against him can recover them
from his insurance company. 23
The public policy principles developed in Stewart and Baker created
a framework for deciding Maidment. In Stewart, the court noted that
270. 107 N.M. 568, 761 P.2d 446 (Ct. App. 1988). For a discussion of the court's jurisdiction
to decide the issue in Maidment, see supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
271. Maidment, 107 N.M. at 569, 761 P.2d at 447.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 571, 761 P.2d at 449.
274. Id. at 569, 761 P.2d at 447.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Stewart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 744, 726 P.2d 1374 (1986); Baker
v. Armstrong, 106 N.M. 395, 744 P.2d 170 (1987).
278. 104 N.M. 744, 726 P.2d 1374.
279. Id. at 747, 726 P.2d at 1377.
280. Id.
281. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
282. 106 N.M. 395, 744 P.2d 170. This case is treated fully in Sanders, Insurance Law, 19 N.M.L.
REV. 717, 729-31 (1989).
283. Baker, 106 N.M. at 398, 744 P.2d at 173.
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the legislative purpose behind mandatory uninsured motorist coverage is
to "protect the insured against the financially unresponsible motorist,
not to protect the insurance company. ' 28" In addition, while the court
recognized that the policy of punitive damages is to punish the tortfeasor
and compensate the victim, the court found that punishment would not
be subverted because the insurance company would have subrogation
rights against the tortfeasor. 25 Punishment was not subverted because
the burden was merely shifted from the insured to the insurance company
to file suit against the tortfeasor.2 8 6
In Baker, the public policy consideration centered on the insurability
of punitive damages. First, the court noted that an insured contemplates
protection for any claims for which he may become liable during the
operation of the insured automobile.28 7 Therefore, insuring punitive dam-
ages meets the reasonable expectations of the insured. 288 The court rejected
Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty.289 McNulty held that
insuring punitive damages is against public policy because punishment
and deterrence would serve no useful purpose if the wrongdoer could
shift the risk to an insurance company.290 In Baker, the court held that
the purchase of insurance does not encourage wrongful acts and deterrence
is not diminished because "it is common knowledge that the prospect
of canceled coverage or rated premiums is a strong deterrent to bad
driving in today's society." '291
The principle of Stewart-that to recover punitive damages from the
insurance company, the insured must be legally entitled to recover from
the tortfeasor-barred recovery to Maidment. 292 The court held that pu-
nitive damages may not be recovered from the estate of the tortfeasor
because the object of punitive damages is to punish the tortfeasor and
not his innocent heirs. 293 Since Maidment was not "legally entitled" to
the damages from the tortfeasor he could not recover them from his
own insurance company. 94 Maidment creatively argued that he met the
"legally entitled to" criteria because "entitlement vests at the moment
of impact. " 295 Maidment asserted that when the fault of the tortfeasor
is established, the insured becomes legally entitled to punitive damages. 296
The court rejected this argument and held that survival of the tortfeasor
284. Stewart, 104 N.M. 743, 746, 726 P.2d 1374, 1376 (quoting Gantt v. L & G Air Conditioning,
101 N.M. 208, 213, 680 P.2d 348, 353 (Ct. App. 1983)).
285. Id. at 747, 726 P.2d at 1377.
286. Id.
287. Baker, 106 N.M. at 396, 744 P.2d at 171.
288. Id.
289. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
290. Id. at 440.
291. 106 N.M. at 398, 744 P.2d at 173.
292. Maidment, 107 N.M. at 569, 761 P.2d at 447.
293. Id. at 571, 761 P.2d at 449 (citing Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988)).
294. Id. at 569, 761 P.2d at 447.
295. Id. at 572, 761 P.2d at 450.
296. Id.
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was necessary for recovery of punitive damages. 297 The court stated that
if "the insured had only to establish the uninsured motorist's fault,
together with damages, it takes no crystal ball to predict the difficulties
the courts might encounter. "298
.The court harkened back to Stewart in two more respects. First, the
policy of punitive damages is to punish the tortfeasor and not to com-
pensate the victim. 29 The court concluded that punishment was not
possible in Maidment because the tortfeasor was dead.3°° Moreover, the
court reiterated the policy underlying Stewart: that punishment is not
subverted when the insurance company can file suit against the tort-
feasor.3 01 Since the insurance company could not file suit against the
estate of the tortfeasor, the underlying policy of Stewart would not be
fulfilled. 0 2 In other words, in Stewart, the burden of filing suit was
"merely shifted" 0 to the insurance company to file suit, but in Maidment
the insurance company could not file suit at all. Therefore, punitive
damages were improper.3°4
The deterrence considerations were different from those outlined in
Baker. In Baker, the court focused on the effect of deterrence on the
tortfeasor himself. 05 Maidment asserted general deterrence considerations;
that is, punitive damages should be awarded because they serve as a
warning to others . 6 The court recognized the goal of deterring others
but held that such deterrence is "inextricably tied" to the tortfeasor.
3 °7
Maidment's argument failed because the tortfeasor died and the oppor-
tunity for general deterrence expired with him.30 8
C. Validity of an Insurance Clause in an Indemnity Contract
In Amoco Production Co. v. Action Well Service, 09 the supreme court
examined the insurance provision of the anti-indemnity statute.310 The
anti-indemnity statute applies to oil, gas, or water wells, and any mineral
mine.3 ' This statute prohibits agreements or covenants which attempt to
indemnify liability for death, bodily injury, property injury, or any other
loss, "or any combination of these arising from the sole or concurrent
297. Id.
298. Id. at 573-74, 761 P.2d at 451-52.
299. Id. at 571, 761 P.2d at 449.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 574, 761 P.2d at 452.
302. Id.
303. Stewart, 104 N.M. at 747, 726 P.2d at 1377.
304. Maidment, 107 N.M. at 574, 761 P.2d at 452.
305. Baker, 106 N.M. at 397-98, 744 P.2d at 172-73.
306. Maidment, 107 N.M. at 571, 761 P.2d at 449.
307. Id. "If the tortfeasor cannot be punished, it follows that there can be no general deterrence."
Id.
308. See id.
309. 107 N.M. 208, 755 P.2d 52 (1988). For a full discussion and analysis of this case, see Note,
New Mexico Interprets the Insurance Clause in the Oil and Gas Anti-Indemnity Statute: Amoco
Production Co. v. Action Well Service, Inc., 20 N.M.L. Rav. 179 (1990).
310. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
311. Id.
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negligence of the indemnitee. "312 The statute expressly provides that such
an agreement or covenant "is against public policy and void and unen-
forceable." ' The statute also contains an exception for insurance, stating
that "Itihis provision shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract
or any benefit conferred by the Workmen's Compensation Act. ' 31 4
Amoco Production Company (Amoco) owned and maintained an oil
lease site where Action Well Service Company (Action Well) was working
as an independent contractor. 15 Amoco and Action Well entered into an
indemnity contract providing that Amoco would not be held liable for
the injury or death of Action Well employees. 316 This indemnity contract
further provided that Action Well "agrees to insure this assumption of
liability.' '317
Freddie Wagoner, an employee of Action Well, was killed while working
at the oil lease site owned and maintained by Amoco.3"' Wagoner's estate
sued Amoco and the parties eventually settled out of court for $500,000.319
Amoco then sought reimbursement from Action Well under the indemnity
contract. 320 Action Well had procured insurance for the indemnity agree-
ment with two different companies. 321 One company had become insolvent
by the time the dispute arose. 322 The other insurance agreement was with
Harbor Insurance Company. 323
At issue was whether the insurance provision was valid under the anti-
indemnity statute and whether Action Well should have honored the
indemnity contract.3 24 In the leading New Mexico case construing this
statute, Guitard v. Gulf Oil Co. ,325 the supreme court held that an
agreement in which the indemnitor would indemnify the indemnitee for
the indemnitor's negligence was valid.326 The reverse is not true, however.
The indemnitee cannot contract away liability for his own negligence. 327
Amoco argued on appeal that, despite the holding in Guitard, the company
had a right to contract with Action Well that Action Well would insure
Amoco's liability.3 28 The court rejected the argument and decided the
case in accordance with the public policy rationale of Guitard.329
312. Id. § 56-7-2(A)(4) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Amoco, 107 N.M. at 209, 755 P.2d at 53.
316. Id.
317. Id. (emphasis in original).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. This agreement provided that Harbor "shall have the right and shall be given the
opportunity to associate with [Action] in defense and control of any claim or suit reasonably likely
to involve [Harbor]." Id.
324. Id.
325. 100 N.M. 358, 670 P.2d 969 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 327, 670 P.2d 581 (1983).
326. See id. at 362, 670 P.2d at 973.
327. Id. at 361, 670 P.2d at 972.
328. Amoco, 107 N.M. at 210, 755 P.2d at 54.
329. Id. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
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In Guitard, the court stated that "the public policy behind section 56-
7-2(A) is to promote safety." 330 The statute promoted safety by not
allowing the indemnitee, generally the operator of the well or mine, "to
delegate to subcontractors his duty to see that the well or mine is safe." 33
Thus, the court in Amoco held that the language providing for the
validity of insurance contracts applied "to insurance purchased by the
indemnitor to protect its interests and not the interests of the indem-
nitee. "332
III. SUBROGATION
The doctrine of subrogation recognizes that the liability insurer has an
obligation to pay its injured insured but also has a right to recover the
amount paid to the insured from the tortfeasor.33 In Farmers Insurance
Group of Companies v. Martinez,334 the court of appeals addressed the
issue of the subrogation rights of an insurer after the dismissal with
prejudice of the insured's lawsuit against the tortfeasor. The court did
not apply ordinary res judicata principles to determine whether the insurer
should be barred in a subsequent suit against the tortfeasor.335 Instead
the court set forth principles which depended on the tortfeasor's knowledge
of the insurer's subrogation claim.336
In Martinez, the insured, Katherine Barreras, was injured by the tort-
feasor, Martinez 3 7 Barreras filed suit against Martinez but later vol-
untarily decided not to pursue the action.338 The court dismissed the case
with prejudice.33 9 Subsequently, the insurer, Farmers Insurance Group of
Companies (Farmers Insurance) filed suit against Martinez, joining Bar-
reras as a party plaintiff.34 Farmers Insurance sought reimbursement
from Martinez for the medical expenses it had allegedly paid Barreras .341
Martinez filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the defense of res judicata.3 42
Farmers Insurance dropped Barreras from its lawsuit and opposed the
motion to dismiss.34 3 The trial court ruled that Barreras' prior action
against Martinez barred the subsequent action. 344
The court of appeals reversed the motion to dismiss and remanded to
the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.3 45 The court held that the
330. Guitard, 100 N.M. at 361, 670 P.2d at 972.
331. Id. at 362, 670 P.2d at 973.
332. Amoco, 107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55 (emphasis in original).
333. 16 M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 61.37 (2d ed. 1984).
334. 107 N.M. 82, 752 P.2d 797 (Ct. App. 1988).
335. Id. at 83, 752 P.2d at 798.
336. Id. at 83-84, 752 P.2d at 798-99.
337. Id. at 83, 752 P.2d at 798.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 84, 752 P.2d at 799. On appeal three calendar notices were filed. The third calendar
notice proposed to reverse and remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. No memorandum
in opposition to the third calendar notice was filed by Martinez. Id.
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tortfeasor's knowledge of a subrogation claim is necessary to determine
whether the subsequent action in this case should be barred.3 4 The trial
court was instructed to find when the insurance payment was made and
whether the tortfeasor had knowledge of the insurance payment.3 47
The court noted that subrogation, whether legal or conventional,34 "is
an equitable remedy, and equitable principles control its application. ' 3 49
Therefore, "subrogation is properly analyzed under the law governing
such claims and not under ordinary res judicata principles.' '350
The court recognized three principles governing the application of res
judicata in subrogation cases. First, "[i]f an insured settles with a tort-
feasor before an insurer has paid damages to the insured, the insurer's
subrogation rights are destroyed and the settlement is a bar to a suit by
the insurer against the tortfeasor.''351 It is a general principle of sub-
rogation that an insurance company's rights to subrogation do not arise
until the insurance company pays damages to its insured.35 2 Thus, the
insurance company cannot claim subrogation rights until it has paid
damages 53
Second, "[if an insured files suit against, and settles with, the tortfeasor
after receiving payment from the insurer, and the tortfeasor had knowledge
of that payment or of the insurer's subrogation claim, the settlement
will not be a bar to the insurer's suit against the tortfeasor. ' 354 The
basis for this principle is that if a tortfeasor has knowledge of a settlement
between the insurer and insured and he nevertheless procures a release
and settlement with the insured, he is committing fraud upon the insurer. 35
Third, "[i]f, on the other hand, an insured files suit against, and settles
with, the tortfeasor after receiving payment from the insurer, and the
tortfeasor has no notice or knowledge of that payment or of the insurer's
subrogation claim, the settlement will bar the insurer's suit against the
tortfeasor. ' 356 This principle differs from the second principle above
because the tortfeasor is settling in good faith and without knowledge. 3 7
The court noted that the holding in a New Mexico subrogation case,
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Raton Natural Gas Co.,358 was
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. "'Legal subrogation' ... is a principle of equity; it is effected by operation of law and
arises out of a relationship that need not be contractually based. 'Conventional subrogation' arises
out of the contractual relationship." R. JERRY, supra note 127, § 96(b).
349. Martinez, 107 N.M. at 83, 752 P.2d at 798.
350. Id.
351. Id. (emphasis in original). This principle has been applied in the following cases: March v.
Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 101 N.M. 689, 692, 687 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1984); Jacobsen v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 N.M. 280, 491 P.2d 168 (1971); Motto v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 81 N.M. 35, 462 P.2d 620 (1969); Armijo v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 75 N.M. 592,
408 P.2d 750 (1965).
352. See R. JERRY, supra note 127, § 96(h).
353. Id. at 465.
354. Martinez, 107 N.M. at 84, 752 P.2d at 799 (emphasis in original).
355. M. RHODES, supra note 333, § 61:201.
356. 107 N.M. at 84, 752 P.2d at 799.
357. M. RHODES, supra note 333, § 61:203.
358. 86 N.M. 160, 521 P.2d 122 (1974).
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"premised on the fact that the tortfeasor had knowledge of the insurer's
payment to the insured" and did not allow "the single cause of action
rule, which is a form of res judicata, . . .to bar the insurer's lawsuit." 35 9
Thus, the court considered the tortfeasor's knowledge of payment and
a subrogation claim "crucial to the application of res judicata in such
cases. "60
IV. BAD FAITH
The fundamental duties of an insurer to its insured are threefold: to
pay proceeds, to defend, and to settle.3 61 The relationship between insurer
and insured, however, also implies good faith and fair dealing. 362 When
insurers do not act in accordance with the standard of good faith they
may be liable in a bad faith action.163 Bad faith can be founded either
in contract or in tort; New Mexico recognizes both causes of action.3 64
In Jessen v. National Excess Insurance Co. ,365 the supreme court af-
firmed an award of punitive damages in a first-party bad faith claim.
The supreme court considered several issues. First, the court addressed
whether the trial court erred in its instructions to the .jury on punitive
damages3'6 and the standard of proof required to prove punitive dam-
ages.167 The court also considered whether the trial court erred by not
instructing the jury on a comparative bad faith standard. 6 Further, the
court addressed whether the insurer could be liable for the bad faith of
an independent contractor. 69 Finally, the court considered whether the
attorneys, fees assessed against the insurance company were proper.370
Larry Jessen and Michael McCoun, airplane pilots, first procured
insurance under a lessor's policy with National Excess Insurance Company
(National) for a Cessna 310 airplane.3 7' Part of this policy required Jessen
to provide information about his piloting experience. 372 Jessen telephoned
Ruth Corbett, an agent of National, and told her he had a current
medical certificate and 1200 hours of total flying time.3 73 One month
359. Martinez, 107 N.M. at 84, 752 P.2d at 799.
360. Id.
361. R. JERRY, supra note 127, § 25(g).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. The first New Mexico case to actually uphold an award of punitive damages in an insurance
bad faith action based on breach of contract was Curtiss v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 N.M. 105,
560 P.2d 169 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976). The following cases have
recognized the tort of bad faith: State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 759, 527 P.2d
798, 800 (1974); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Montoya, 90 N.M. 556, 566 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1977);
Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 429, 553 P.2d 703, 709 (Ct. App. 1976).
365. 108 N.M. 625, 776 P.2d 1244 (1989).
366. Id. at 627, 776 P.2d at 1246.
367. Id. at 628, 776 P.2d at 1247.
368. Id. at 630, 776 P.2d at 1249.
369. Id. at 629, 776 P.2d at 1248.
370. Id. at 630, 776 P.2d at 1249.
371. Id. at 626, 776 P.2d at 1245.
372. Id.
373. Id.
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after Jensen and McCoun were added to the lessor's policy, they decided
to buy the airplane and sought to continue the insurance coverage under
the previous airplane owner's policy with National.3 74 Jessen contacted
Corbett, signed an insurance application, and paid one-third of the first
year's premium.3 75 Two days later, Jessen and McCoun were involved in
an airplane accident; although they received only minor injuries, the plane
was destroyed.3 76
National conducted an independent investigation of the crash.3 77 The
pilot logbook, the only verification of Jessen's flight experience, was
never found. 7 1 Jessen, however, signed an Airman's Records Release
allowing National's investigator to obtain copies of Jessen's records from
the FAA. 79 Jessen also offered National an affidavit stating that the
1200 hours flying time was accurately represented in the insurance ap-
plication.3 80
Six months later National made a settlement offer of $11,000; however,
the policy provided coverage up to $25,000.381 Jessen and McCoun refused
to settle and filed an action for bad faith and breach of contract. 82 Two
years passed before the case came to trial; during this time National
neither paid nor denied Jessen and McCoun's claim.383
At trial, the court instructed the jury that Jessen and McCoun had
the burden of proof to show that National failed within a reasonable
amount of time to pay proceeds as required by the policy, and in doing
so, deviated from appropriate standards used in the insurance industry.3s4
The court defined bad faith to the jury as "refusal to pay or delay in
paying the claim for frivolous or unfounded reasons." '385 The jury awarded
$25,000 compensatory damages and $75,000 punitive damages.3 86 National
appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a jury
instruction on punitive damages. 8 7
In New Mexico, "bad faith supports an award of punitive damages
upon a finding of entitlement to compensatory damages. ' 38 New Mexico
has two standards for punitive damages in a breach of contract action.
Punitive damages may be awarded "when the defendant's conduct was
malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed recklessly with a wanton
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. d.
381. Id.
382. Id,
383. Id. at 627, 776 P.2d at 1246.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 626, 776 P.2d at 1245.
387. Id. at 627, 776 P.2d at 1246.
388. Id. (citing United Nuclear Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 480, 485, 709 P.2d
649, 654 (1985)).
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disregard for the plaintiff's rights."38 9 Secondly, in appropriate cases,
punitive damages may be awarded for conduct which was "grossly neg-
ligent." 39 In Jessen, punitive damages were sought for grossly negligent
conduct; accordingly, the supreme court reviewed the evidence to see if
the award was supported under this standard.3 9' National's witness testified
that the claim would have been paid if Jessen had produced the logbook
and that National believed it was not obligated to pay until the flight
experience was positively verified.3 92 On the other side, the court noted
evidence that an investigator for National only spent seventy-two hours
investigating the claim and did not attempt to fully verify Jessen's flight
experience, despite access to the information.3 93 Further, Jessen's expert
testified that National's conduct was not in accordance with accepted
industry standards and had "put an unduly harsh burden on the
plaintiff."3 94 Finally, the investigation did not reveal any misrepresentation
on the part of Jessen. a95 Given this evidence, the supreme court held that
an instruction of punitive damages was appropriate when the evidence
"shows that the insurer utterly failed to exercise care for the interests
of the insured in denying or delaying payment on an insurance policy." 319
The trial court had instructed the jury that the standard of proof for
punitive damages was "preponderance of the evidence," as set forth in
United Nuclear Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.a97 National
argued for the higher "clear and convincing" standard. 98 The court
declined to readdress the Allendale standard because the plaintiffs had
"justifiably relied" on this standard.399
The court also considered the absence of a jury instruction on com-
parative bad faith.4 National asserted that since the trial court had
instructed the jury on misrepresentations by the insured, the court should
have also instructed the jury on a comparative bad faith standard. 40
National's support for this contention was twofold. First, New Mexico
has recognized comparative negligence since Bartlett v. New Mexico Weld-
ing Supply.402 Second, a California court has held that comparative fault
applies in bad faith cases. 403 In Jessen, the supreme court held that the
389. Id. at 628, 776 P.2d at 1247 (citing Green Tree Acceptance Co. v. Layton, 108 N.M. 171,
173, 769 P.2d 84, 86 (1989)).
390. Id. (citing Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, 105 N.M. 575, 734 P.2d 1258 (1987); Valdez v. Warner,
106 N.M. 305, 742 P.2d 517 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 353, 742 P.2d 1058 (1987)).
391. Id. at 627-28, 776 P.2d at 1246-47.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 627, 776 P.2d at 1246.
394. Id. at 628, 776 P.2d at 1247.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. 103 N.M. 480, 484, 709 P.2d 649, 654 (1983).
398. Jessen, 108 N.M. at 628, 776 P.2d at 1247.
399. Id. at 629, 776 P.2d at 1248.
400. Id. at 630, 776 P.2d at 1249.
401. Id.
402. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
403. California Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 218 Cal. Rptr.
817 (1985).
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trial court's failure to give a comparative bad faith instruction was not
error, because the jury considered but did not find misrepresentation. °0
If the jury had found misrepresentation by the plaintiff, Jessen, this
finding would have barred an award of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy.4°5
National also asserted that punitive damages should not be assessed
against it for the acts of the investigator, an independent contractor.4
The court rejected this defense.40 The court noted that an absolute duty,
imposed by the common law, statute, or municipal ordinance, cannot
be delegated to an independent contractor.4 Particularly in insurance
dealings, "the duty of good faith dealing by parties to an insurance
contract has been recognized as a nondelegable duty." 9 This led the
court to hold that the acts of an independent contractor did not relieve
National of its liability. 410
Finally, National argued that the award of attorneys' fees was im-
proper. 41' National asserted that under the statutory provision for attor-
neys' fees and costs, 412 the trial court must find the insurer acted
unreasonably in failing to pay the claim. 413 Since no such finding was
made, National asserted that the trial court erred in awarding attorneys'
fees. 41 4 The court held that because the trial court instructed the jury on
a reckless as well as a gross negligence standard, the award of punitive
damages implied a finding of unreasonableness. 415 Unreasonableness may
be implied because the unreasonable tortious action "is subsumed under
the more egregious standards of recklessness or gross negligence.' '416
Further, the standard for reviewing a punitive damages award is abuse
of discretion, and "[biased on the implied finding of unreasonableness,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 417
V. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Sappington v. Covington418 involved a common law negligence claim
alleged by Sappington against insurance agents James Covington and
Larry G. Brodie. Sappington, an employee of Levy Auto Supply (Levy),
404. Jessen, 108 N.M. at 630, 776 P.2d at 1249.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 629, 776 P.2d at 1248.
407. Id.
408. Id. (citing Budagher v. Amrep Corp., 97 N.M. 116, 121, 637 P.2d 547, 552 (1981)).
409. Id. (citing Timmon v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1982)).
410. Id. Alternatively, the evidence provided adequate support to find ratification of the inves-
tigator's actions by National. Id. at 628, 776 P.2d at 1249.
411. Id. at 628, 776 P.2d at 1249.
412. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-2-1 (1978).
413. Jessen, 108 N.M. at 630, 776 P.2d at 1249.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 630-31, 776 P.2d at 1249-50.
418. 108 N.M. 155, 768 P.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1988).
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incurred hospital expenses of approximately $20,000 during an illness.41 9
Sappington unsuccessfully sought reimbursement under an insurance plan
purported to be for the benefit of Levy's employees.4 20 Sappington filed
suit against Covington.42'
The complaint alleged that the insurance policy was issued by a company
which was not licensed to do business in New Mexico, that insolvency
proceedings had begun against the company in Texas, and that the
insurance agents represented that the plaintiff was fully insured. 422 The
complaint further alleged that the insurance agent negligently failed to
determine the status of the company and sold the insurance policy without
first determining whether or not the company was solvent. 42a Finally, the
complaint alleged that the agents knew or should have known that the
company issuing the policy was not in good standing in New Mexico. 424
The defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds that the claim was
barred by federal preemption under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).4 25 The motion to dismiss was denied.4 26
The court of appeals granted interlocutory appeal to consider the pre-
emption issue. 427
"The supremacy clause mandates that federal law overrides, i.e., pre-
empts, any state regulation where there is an actual conflict between two
sets of legislation such that both cannot stand. ' 428 Insurance law, which
is pervasively regulated by the states, is not ordinarily subject to federal
preemption. Under the McCarran Ferguson Act 429 Congress provided that
"the business of insurance .. .shall be subject to the laws of the several
States'430 and "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance." ' 43'
ERISA, however, contains a broad preemption clause which provides
that, with few exceptions, the Act "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan. '432 It was not disputed that the health insurance policy involved
419. Id. at 156, 768 P.2d at 355.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at 295 (3d ed. 1986).
429. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1985).
430. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1985).
431. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1985).
432. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1985). The ERISA preemption structure is three-part. The preemption
clause is modified by a "savings clause," 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), and in turn, the "savings
clause" is modified by a "deemer clause," 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(B). Although the preemption
statement is broad, the "savings clause" gives the states latitude to regulate in banking, insurance,
or securities. As stated in section 1144(b)(2)(A), "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking or
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in this case was an employee benefit plan under which any interest in
the benefits of the plan would be protected by ERISA.433 Any state law
directly or indirectly related to the employee benefit plan would be
preempted by ERISA. 434 Furthermore, the words "relate to" are broadly
interpreted when considering the extent of federal preemption. 435
The court, however, concluded that Congress did not intend for state
law on the negligence of insurance agents in selling valid policies to be
preempted by ERISA. 4 6 "The relief sought by plaintiff does not affect
the administration of any plan, nor is plaintiff's claim of liability against
defendant predicated on any right or standard contained in ERISA.
437
ERISA "does not attempt to set standards for or regulate the conduct
of insurance agents involved in acquiring or establising an employee
benefit plan if the agent is not further involved in creation or admin-
istration of the plan. ' 438 More importantly, ERISA does not "set standards
or attempt to regulate the purchase or sale of insurance policies that,
because of the alleged conduct of an agent, never in fact ripen into a
[sic] ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan. ' 4 9 Applying these principles,
the court of appeals emphasized that Sappington's claim focused on the
sale of an insurance policy preceding the institution of a benefit plan.4
0
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss."'
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securities." However, the "deemer clause" prevents states from trying to avoid ERISA under the
pretext of the "savings clause."
Neither an employee benefit plan .. nor any trust established under such a plan,
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company,
or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking
for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies,
insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
433. Sappington, 108 N.M. at 157, 768 P.2d at 356. The court held that the purpose of ERISA
was
to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit plans by requiring
disclosure and reporting of financial and other information to participants by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation, for plan fiduciaries,
and by providing appropriate remedies and sanctions for breach of the duties set
forth in the statute.
Id. at 156, 768 P.2d at 355 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1985)).
434. Id. at 157-58, 768 P.2d at 356-57.
435. Id. at 156, 768 P.2d at 355 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)).
436. Id. at 158, 768 P.2d at 357. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
741 (1985), the Supreme Court stated that state laws regulating those who sell insurance and their
sales practices do not "relate to" employee benefit plans and are not preempted.
437. Sappington, 108 N.M. at 158, 768 P.2d at 357.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
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